I've written a new paper on revolution, which in keeping with my nautical theme of pirate papers' past deals with mutiny aboard 18th-century merchant ships. The paper is entitled, "Rational Choice, Round Robin, and Rebellion: An Institutional Solution to the Problems of Revolution." Here's the abstract:
Two collective action problems plague successful revolution. On the one hand, would-be revolutionaries confront a “participation problem” whereby no rationally self-interested individual has an incentive to participate in rebellion. On the other hand, individuals face a “first-mover problem” whereby no rationally self-interested individual has an incentive to lead rebellion. This paper argues that 18th-century merchant sailors devised an institutional solution to these problems to facilitate maritime revolution and overthrow abusive captains. This institution was called a “Round Robin.” Round Robins solved both the “participation problem” and the “first-mover problem” by aligning the interests of individual sailors desiring mutiny and restructuring the payoffs of leading vs. following maritime rebellion.
Download the full paper here.