Some Words to Think About on Culture, Law, and Social Change

Eric Jones in his Cultures Merging writes:

Without a stiffening by impartial legal and other institutions, cultural values of the types with which we have been concerned lack permanent foundations.  There may exist a preference for growth, and growth may even take place, but it is vulnerable to silent reversal when men, not laws, have the final say over economic activities.  In the last analysis, as Montesquieu and Voltaire knew, liberty and property are preserved by the law and not by values.  By themselves, values are slippery. Their meaning may adjust covertly to circumstances.  Institutions too can be changed, by agreement or fiat, but it is easier to tell when that has happened. (2006, p. 110)

What do you think?*

*Please remember the rules for posting comments ---- no anonymous posts and being rude and insulting is not the same as engaging in rational criticism.  Use your own name and make an argument and not a series of assertions challenging the intellectual and moral merits of your opponent.  If you cannot follow those simple rules, please go elsewhere.  I will try this experiment in civil discourse on the blogosphere one more time.

Comments

[Matt C.]

I want to break this quote up into three separate parts because I have different problems those sections.

The first:
“Without a stiffening by impartial legal and other institutions, cultural values of the types with which we have been concerned lack permanent foundations.”

The main problem with this first sentence is the assumption that that the “legal and other institutions” are impartial. If they were impartial there would not be so much contention between the political parties who try to control those “impartial” institutions. I am assuming of course, because of the lack of background, that we are talking about legislation and not law; which Hayek made the distinction. Cultural values are many times inhibited by those impartial legal institutions. Hernando deSoto points out that in the west there was no problem with property rights because they developed customs locally and it wasn’t until the federal government finally “caught-up” with the west that the “impartial” legal institutions created problems. Thomas Sowell also points out that there are cultural ties that create morals over time; he uses orthodox Jews in New York as an example. There doesn’t need to be any formal institution to create a permanency of laws in the Hayekian sense.

The second:
“There may exist a preference for growth, and growth may even take place, but it is vulnerable to silent reversal when men, not laws, have the final say over economic activities.”

Isn’t this the perfect reason not to have government?

The third:
“In the last analysis, as Montesquieu and Voltaire knew, liberty and property are preserved by the law and not by values. By themselves, values are slippery. Their meaning may adjust covertly to circumstances. Institutions too can be changed, by agreement or fiat, but it is easier to tell when that has happened.”

Values may be slippery, but they can have a much stronger impact on behavior than “impartial legal” institutions. I cannot agree that liberty and property are preserved by law and not by values. It is because of values that laws were created. I would quote Bastiat here: “Life, faculties, production- in other words, individuality, liberty, property- this is man. And in spite of the cunning of artful political leaders, these three gifts from God precede all human legislation, and are superior to it. Life, liberty and property do not exist because men have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place.”

[Rafe Champion]

Good to see the comments back!
What Matt C said, for the most part! We might have learned from Durkheim that consciously articulated rules and laws are the second line of defence of a civilised order with the first line being the values or norms that are internalised while we grow up without anyone being fully aware of the process. Hence the importance of the bouregoise virtues that have been the main target of the adversary culture. Of course there is always room for improvement, hence the need for piecemeal revision of child-raising practices and the like. I appreciate that Durkheim is an ambivalent figure vis a vis Austrian/classical liberal thinking but Jack Birner has written papers to demonstrate that some of the criticisms made (I think) by Pete among others are not fully valid, at least for Durkheim's later work.
In light of this (and recalling Adam Smith on moral sentiments) it is important to see that a sound moral framework is an essential part of the liberal order, on a par with the full range of freedoms, the rule of law and property rights. However talk of morals has been brought into disrepute among progressive people by the most active and visible moralists who focussed too narrowly, invoked incredible sources of moral authority and unacceptable punishments (eternal hellfire). Moral philosophy in the academies bogged down on things like the is/ought problem, lapsed into verbalism (essentialism) and also sought authority where none was to be found. For a more direct attack on the issues: http://sabhlokcity.blogspot.com/2006/07/condensed-open-society-chapter-5.html

[Ryan Myke Daza]

I first want to note that I have not read the Jones’s book and this analysis is strictly from the quote presented by professor Boettke. Second, I will assume that “value” here in “changing in circumstance” implies that a previous order was endogenously self-sustained in preserving liberty and property. An exogenous circumstance changes it. I do not attempt to be comprehensive but rather concise. I wrote this quickly just to get some ideas out. Many of the ideas come from the shoulders of giants and some are original. All are subject to critique.

Social order is endogenously sustained through informal enforcement mechanisms such as guilt, shaming, honor, threat of ostracization, etc. It is a coordination game and thus self-enforcing [Hardin]. The third party “impartial” legal or “other institutions” derive their legitimacy (power in action) from two contesting parties that demand resolution through this formal institution. This creates a cooperative prisoners dilemma and, therefore, incentives to deviate. This order is not self-enforcing [Axlerod]. In both orders, culture (cultivated norms proscribing actions relevant to coordinate social interaction) and is valued by those who benefit from this coordination by definition cannot be slippery. Values in cultural form (learned generationally) are hard and costly to loose swiftly (institutional stickiness/path dependence). In coordination they dominate and by convention they are maintained. This does not mean they cannot change or that the status quo benefits all; it merely demonstrates that values can only be ideally slippery. Change by fiat thus implies power; the coordination is exogenized (via 3rd party) and transformed into a PD game. A derived source of power can impose partiality to coordinating orders (creating rent-seeking environments, privileged groups, etc). It is here that the “republican disease” and the “social dilemma” become induced. Strong governments and Majorities are the more endowed threats to liberty and property. A formal order is induced via an informal order. Change via endogenous coordination is very difficult [Olson, Weingast, Tullock]. Change via an empowered 3rd party can make this more difficult and use certain groups to attenuate liberty and excel expropriation [Machiavelli].

First, I will analyze how value is derived from the individual in the group and then, how the group sustains and changes an order informally. Next, I will show how Jones misstated and how he was close by explaining a possible danger of informal social order. Finally, I will propose an approach to properly evaluate what Jones may have not perceived.
* *
There is no “meaning” in values. Norms (cultivated or not) hold value to those who operate under it. Its function in coordinating with others and the subsequent cost of loosing this adhesive property (along with the opportunity cost or benefit of a new norm), and in the competition of reputations (promise breakers/cheats), derives value. Expectations, reputations, and coordinations are key factors. In complex societies this is not calculated, it is internalized and cultivated¬: learned through childhood or later and legitimated viz. experience (repeated interaction) or convention (path dependency). It operates without immediate thought [Hayek] enhancing social fluidity. It is the economization of information. Economizing information (especially that which gives us knowledge on how to coordinate) is the epitome of civilization contra communitarianism or simple tribal society (Ostrom). Constant interaction aggregates knowledge of relevant information for coordinating actors to create “consensus” to make informed decisions; this is a check on keeping the reputation game out of the PD (Colson). This also makes norms outcome based (contra Elster) and therefore evaluative.

Continuing from Rafe with Adam Smith’s TMS, sentiment or sympathy is derived with relativity. Identity is the primal motivator of action. How an individual in a group can cross identify, or “bring to one’s chest” as Smith relates, depends on their evaluation of the values held by others. This is worthiness of approbation. This is imaginatively projected in estimation for evaluation for “worthiness” capacity via self-worthiness. Smith correlates this with his China analogy.
* *
A value of a norm can informally rise via a new idea, but if it serves the order no purpose, it will be marginalized. If a status quo order via convention operates on a level that is costly to its members, new ideas can reinforce coordination by creating a norm whose constraints operate in a way that the members prefer [Hayek]. However, non-economic preferences can sustain negative norms/culture. Dominant actors (status identities, i.e.: aristocracy) that maintain a hold on individual actions within the groups use exclusionary norms (shame, guilt, non-cooperation) in place of formal legal and enforcement structures. Here, ideas (usually general values that do not operate well in particular group structures) are suppressed. These values are not slippery. When a value, which has not been cultivated, adjusts via circumstance, it is due to a culture lacking a norm to answer it. However, it is more likely, especially in complex (USA) orders, that capricious change comes from the formal legal and political institutions. The value give a norm its legitimacy; the distribution and the individual magnitude, and the position of power held by an individual, all contribute to the robust structure of the constitutional (constraints) social order. Ideas–new norms–value from its function–cultivation from members–dependency on its operation for social interaction, all affect how orders can be changed and maintained. It is extremely robust and necessitates more power in its change than in its continuity.
* *
Is there danger in informal orders? Biological identification can work only on surface when relative actors are under threat by others who generalize their actions based upon biological/phenotype focal point, like skin color, that their other groups do not share. Individuals can discriminate via visible points like skin color but not by tastes. (If there is a war between those who like chocolate versus vanilla, all I have to do is switch when in public–not so with skin color). People have multiple identities and identity preference sets that can be strategically reorganized relative to circumstance. A derivative “value” must permeate all dominant identities (sex, race, religion, ethnicity, job, etc). This fractionalization through the creation of social capital to maintain solidarity viz. exclusionary norms fractures information conduits between groups. Knowledge necessary to make relevant unknowns worthy of sympathy erodes and conflict proliferates.

Example: Here in DC there were 10 shooting one night, with my window open I was able to hear gunshots. I concerned me until I found out why they occurred: it was “gang related.” The action was directed at particulars that I was not related. However, if I found out that the attacks were directed universally to generalities (that are visible–remember, I can always switch between chocolate and vanilla) such as “Latinos,” they issue would become relevant. If the transgressors shared a derivative visible trait that I do not hold, it would become severe. The actions become exogenous and solidarity (exclusionary) norms rise making differences visible. This line of action is much more prevalent in familial-tribal and clan social organizations. But the need for impartial third parties becomes more apparent. In complex societies identity sets are more diverse and visible identities are further down the preference set (they serve less of a function in plural societies than in tribal ones). It is here that values are lost to expediency and become ‘slippery.” This is however no different in the international system where nationalism become the solidarity function.

** * **

In order to properly analyze what mechanism are in operation relative to institutional constraint, growth preferences, cultural conducivity to liberty and property, and especially what factors are causally connected to change (and who it leaves worst off), a few fundamental conditions have to be met; call it the economics of culture (anthropology):

1: Not all cost evaluation can be analyzed viz. economics; sociology is necessary

2: Sociology must eliminate both Marx and Durkheim and embrace Smith and Weber (any quality the former two have is already in the latter + sans any useless substantivist-formalist debate)

3: Knowledge problem, Rational Choice and Methodological Individualism for analysis are proper regularity institutions (yes, academics too have culture, norms, values and therefore institutions).

4: Psychologically, value is subjective; this is useful when deriving specifics

5: The use of empirics is to generate specifics of the informal institutional order. This is dome via anthropological ethnography and ethnology (similar to what DeSoto did)

6: History is relevant for evolutionary and cultural continuity.

This is foundational and not necessarily cross-disciplinary. The imperial nature of the dominate social science is necessary. The theoretical framework must come from economics (though not necessarily neo-classical) including game theory, new institutional economics, comparative political economy, and constitutional political economy. Normative evaluations are derived from positive foundations. Moving across social sciences will be necessary

This is conjecture can help us understand how the paragraph given is a misstatement. Many gaps cannot be explained here (It is long enough). I ask only to avoid ad hominem attacks and to focus of the structure of my critique and methodological proposal for an approach to an Economics of Anthropology: the constitutions of social order.

:Ryan Myke Daza

[Mario Rizzo]

Realistically, liberty and property exhibit a powerful tendency to erode regardless of the law or initial values. Values also erode. Which more quickly? I doubt there are any universal generalizations that are correct. In the US I venture a conjecture that pro-market law eroded faster (under the influence of elites) than the common man's values.

[Sudha Shenoy]

The common law served as an excellent tool for economic growth, _&_ to protect individuals, from the late 15th century onwards. Legislation & govt began encroaching from the late 19th century onwards: as political _ideas_ changed, towards a democratic despotism. This last was first enunciated in the late 18th century (& well-denounced by Burke.)

From 1914 onwards, political ideas & ideals (in the DCs) have become evermore despotic, disguised & justified by, 'democratic' ideology. The continuing & growing influence of an ever-expanding officialdom underpins the above: docile subjects are essential to the whole.

[Rafe]

Of course bad law can be made by the stroke of the legislator's pen and mores take longer to crumble but they can go eventually, less than 30 years in the case of many outback Aboriginal communities in Australia, as sketched in a recent speech. Warning, this is not pleasant reading. http://catallaxyfiles.com/?p=3199

A big question, what is the timetable for recovery when both the laws and the moral framework have gone bad? Russia and the USSR provide a kind of natural experiment where different numbers of generations were exposed to the system. One would predict the rate of recovery to be inversely related to the period of communist occupation, modified by other factors such as the influence of civil structures that persisted for the duration such as the Church in Poland.