Pete, Chris, and I have two new papers of potential interest. Links and abstracts below:
"Saving Government Failure Theory from Itself: Recasting Political Economy from an Austrian Perspective," forthcoming in Constitutional Political Economy.
The economic approach to politics revolutionized the way scholars in economics and political science approached the study of political decision-making by introducing the possibility of government failure. However, the persistent and consistent application of neoclassical models of economics also seemed to suggest that once the full costs were accounted for, this failure was an illusion. This paper counters these arguments associated with George Stigler, Gary Becker and more recently Donald Wittman, at the core of the economic theory that underlies their approach. In contrast, we develop an alternative model of political economy grounded in the Austrian conception of the dynamic market process.
"Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics," forthcoming in American Journal of Economics and Sociology.
Research examining the importance of path dependence and culture for institutions and development tells us ‘history matters,’ but not how history matters. To provide this missing ‘how,’ we provide a framework for understanding institutional ‘stickiness’ based on the Regression Theorem. The Regression Theorem maintains that the stickiness, and therefore likely success, of any proposed institutional change is a function of that institution’s status in relationship to indigenous agents in the previous time period. This framework for analyzing institutional stickiness creates the core of what we call the New Development Economics. Historical cases of post-war reconstruction and transition efforts provide evidence for our claim.
Comments are open.